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Aircraft Marketing 
In an Era of Deregulation 
by 
J.A.F. Nicholls 
Associate Professor 
College of Business Administration 
Florida International University 
The deregulation of commercial aviation has had far-reaching effects on 
all aspects of business. In the Spring 1984 issue, the author explored some 
of the changes in the domestic airline industry. This article discusses the 
effects of deregulation on another group - those who manufacture com- 
mercial aircraft. 
Individuals working in the hospitality industry are well aware of 
certain phases of the impact of airline deregulation on their business. 
The 1978 act deregulating commercial aviation in the United States 
was nothing short of revolutionary. Indeed, it was so revolutionary 
that Alfred Kahn, former Carter administration official and chairman 
of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) who led the fight to deregulate 
airlines, now believes that deregulation may have spawned unfair com- 
petition. As he sees it, particular air fares may have been set at  rates 
that, in antitrust terminology, might be called "predatory," overpriced 
in some markets, underpriced in others.' 
In effect, deregulation originally allowed airlines to set fares, sched- 
ules, and routes within very broad limits. Since 1983 air fares have 
been free of government regulation, and beginning in 1985, the CAB 
made provision to phase itself out.2 
The fare and route changes, especially with the entry of nimble, low- 
overhead, low-cost, new air carriers, have been, perhaps, the most widely 
discussed and most visible effects of the government's deregulation 
efforts. The distress and occasional bankruptcy of the giant carriers 
- like Braniff and Continental - has made the pages of leading busi- 
ness publications. The effect of all this on the hospitality industry is 
well known. 
On the other hand, the effect of deregulation and increased com- 
petitiveness on the manufacturers of commercial aircraft - the air- 
frame and aeroengine producers - is rather less well known. The term 
"fleet planning" is one which refers to an airline's selection process 
for the number and type of aircraft it chooses to fly. This process is 
crucial not only to the buyers, the airlines, but also to the sellers, the 
airframe and aeroengine makers. I t  is this process that has been so 
heavily impacted by domestic deregulation in the United States, the 
heavy discounting of international air fares, and the long lead times 
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in airplane production. 
The design, development, prototype, and, finally, production of a new 
aircraft constitutes an enormous gamble by airframe and aeroengine 
producers. From inception to production takes five or six years.3 The 
enormity of this commitment was described by Robert Carlson, presi- 
dent of United Tkchnologies Corporation (UTC) and former head of 
UTC's subsidiary, Pratt & W h i t n e ~ . ~  Carlson's scenario indicated that 
100 designers, 250 engineers, and 150 draftsmen would be needed to 
have an initial test rig operating by July 1986 if they began on Janu- 
ary 1, 1985. The first engine will be running by January 1987, having 
cost $150 million. More prototypes will be needed so that certifica- 
tion can be obtained and the first production engine delivered to the 
airframe manufacturer by June 1989, at the cost of some $600 million. 
After another 18 months of development, and a further $100 million 
of production costs, the first aircraft is delivered to the first customer 
about January 11, 1991. During all that time, six years, no cash has 
been coming into the engine producer; $700 million has been spent, 
and, with interest costs on borrowed funds, this sum probably amounts 
to $1 billion or more. Even this is not the end to the spending com- 
mitment. Between 1991 and 1993 another $120 million will be spent 
in custom tailoring the engine to the needs of individual airline cus- 
tomers, and $30 million a year will be spent thereafter. 
Only after 12-18 years and the production of a minimum of 1,200 
engines will the engine manufacturer break even. No wonder Carlson 
warned: "If you're a beginner, let me strongly suggest the stakes are 
too high and the risks too great.?'5 
The airframe supplier has a similarly extended and costly develop- 
ment and production process to undertake before receiving any return 
on its enormous outlays either. In the case of the airframe manufac- 
turer, costs run upwards of $2 billion, although the time involved is 
18 months to two years less than the enginemaker's and 400-600 
aircraft sales are needed to break even. 
Competitive Suppliers Do Exist 
This discussion does not take into consideration, of course, the fact 
that airframe or engine manufacturers are not monopolists. They com- 
pete for sales in an industry that is highly oligopolized, In the free 
world there are three suppliers of airframes, two American, Boeing 
and McDonnell Douglas, and one, a European consortium, Airbus. For 
engines, there are three suppliers, too. General Electric and Pratt & 
Whitney are the Americans and Rolls-Royce the English entry. 
These closely-knit aircraft oligopolies are fiercely competitive Each 
player in the high-stakes games knows his competitors' every move 
Like all oligopolies the game is intricate, interdependent, and, ulti- 
mately, zero-sum. The last point, a relatively new development, is fright- 
ening since the marketplace is not large enough for all players to be 
able to make a profit. Volume is the only way for aircraft manufac- 
turers to recoup their enormous commitment of time, money, and other 
resources. 
In all of this, the slightest misjudgment can be fatal. For example, 
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in attempting to supply the Lockheed TriStar, or L-1011, as  it is also 
known, with its power source, Rolls Royce promised technologically 
advanced engines a t  a rock-bottom price Rolls went into receivership, 
its aeroengine division being rescued by the British government. Lock- 
heed, in turn, produced its TriStar in the early '70s in direct competi- 
tion with McDonnell Douglas's widebodied DC-10. As a result, both 
companies fought a war of attrition for a market in the 1970s that 
could not support each of them. Neither lived up to its sales or profits 
potential. When Lockheed closed its TriStar production line last year, 
withdrawing from the civil aircraft market, it had sold 244 aircraft; 
McDonnell Douglas had delivered 360 by that time and virtually closed 
its production lines, too, except for a few outstanding military ord- 
ers for KC-10, cargo-tanker versions.6 
New Competition Exists 
The emerging competitor to the industry leader Boeing and the dis- 
tant, although still gritty, McDonnell Douglas is Airbus Industrie, the 
relatively recent arrival on the international scene. Airbus Industrie 
is a consortium owned by four western European partners. France and 
West Germany, the original partners, each have a 37.09 percent share; 
Britain has 20 percent and Spain 4.2 percent. Essentially, the corpo- 
ration was founded in order to combat the European fear of an Ameri- 
can monopoly in the world commercial aircraft industry. European 
aircraft such as  the BAC 1-11, the Caravelle, the Concorde, Mercure, 
and the Trident had never been able to enjoy production runs to equal 
those of their competitors in the United States. Until the advent of 
the Airbus A-300 model, European producers had averaged produc- 
tion runs of under 100, compared to the 450 of American  producer^.^ 
In effect, the European planes had been tailored to meet the needs 
of the flagship carriers of their producing countries - Air France in 
the case of the Caravelle and the Mercure, British Airways for the BAC 
1-11 and the Trident. Their design features were too specific and special- 
ized to hold much attraction for customers beyond their original ones. 
Airbus Industrie represents a European attempt to change this insu- 
lated approach by pooling resources and suborning nationalistic com- 
petition to combat American colossi before a permanent American 
monopoly emerges, with consequent loss of jobs and technology. 
The production process for the Airbus A-300 and A-310 aircraft is 
very unusual. Portions of the Airbus models are made in different coun- 
tries. The larger portions, such as  wings, are made in Britain and the 
fuselages in West Germany, then ferried on a continuing basis to the 
final assembly area in Toulouse in southern France. The enormous 
transport planes that do this ferrying are known as "Super-Guppies1' 
Some of the Airbus is even manufactured in the United  state^.^ 
The sale of the wide-bodied A-300 to Eastern in late 1977 was the 
first European sale to a trunk carrier since the Vickers turboprop 15 
years earlier.g Formerly, before the advent of Airbus, American 
producers had sold 95 percent of the commercial aircraft in the non- 
communist world. Of the three remaining airplane suppliers in the west, 
Boeing has sold more than 4,000 commercial jet aircraft, McDonnell 
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Douglas over 2,300 and Airbus over 400.1° What has happened now, 
though, is that Boeing is no longer on the cutting edge of design. Its 
best selling aircraft, the 727, has finally completed its production last 
year, after racking up sales of 1,832, the best in history. Delivery of 
the 747 has slowed, and the 757 and the 767 are just under way. There 
is no new competition for the Airbus A-320. Boeing has produced the 
737-300 recently and projects the 737-400 to counteract the A-320. 
This technological fact, allied to the fragmentation of the domestic 
airline system in the U.S., is causing Boeing some consternation. 
Domestic Deregulation Has Impact 
Deregulation of the domestic airline system has affected the aircraft 
business, both airframes and engines, in two ways. First, it has frag- 
mented the airline industry by permitting the entrance of numerous 
low cost carriers. Virtually anybody who can afford to lease an air- 
craft or put a down payment on a used one can join the fray. Fkaders 
may have seen the report on two University of Miami MBA students 
who with their faculty advisor decided to start their own airline. The 
proliferation of airline competitors like Midway, Jet Express, South- 
west, etc has split the decision makers in purchasing new aircraft. Since 
deregulation, the number of U.S. airlines has tripled to about 130 
currently. I 
The real long-term nightmare for aircraft suppliers is that the gi- 
ant carriers, domestic and international, may become obsolete in the 
new era of competition, being cut back in size and replaced or aug- 
mented by smaller carriers, none of which is capable of placing an or- 
der large enough to launch a new plane. Fortunately, this danger is 
still distant since Boeing had sufficient large orders from Eastern (27), 
British Airways (19), and, particularly, Delta (60), to start production 
of its new 757, as  did Airbus for its A-310. Of course, if the large car- 
riers survive, Eastern and Pan Am, in particular, weathering their cur- 
rent financial problems, then the airframe and engine makers' fears 
will have proved groundless. The giant carriers which remain will be 
considerably leaner and more efficient. There is some indication that 
this may happen, since the big carriers seem to be coming to grips 
with their new competitors, learning to meet the same areas as  their 
newer competitors but counterpunching with increased flights. In the 
past few months, it has been the new entrants who have been facing 
increased financial  problem^.'^ 
Second, the major carriers have seized on the opportunities offered 
by deregulation to drop many of their low-density routes (except where 
they feed a hub-and-spokes operation) to concentrate on higher den- 
sity, longer-haul routes.I3 This rationalization process has included a 
movement toward greater efficiency through standardization of air- 
craft fleets. Again, this has placed tremendous pressure on the air- 
craft manufacturers through the increased tendency for the airlines 
to rely on a single airframe and engine manufacturer so as to increase 
maintenance efficiency. 
Accordingly, manufacturers have been forced to develop families of 
aircraft to meet the airlines' varied requirements of route length, pas- 
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senger density, e tc  Boeing's family of new 757s, 767s, and, possibly, 
777s, following established 727, 737, and 747 lines, is no coincidence. 
Neither is Airbus' competitive A-300s, A-310s, and A-320s. McDon- 
nell Douglas is attempting to keep pace through its various stretched 
versions of the DC-9 and the Super 80s, 82s, 83s, and 90s. In the case 
of McDonnell Douglas, the company is, essentially, attempting to 
develop its proven DC-9 technology, rather than run the risk of com- 
mitting itself to $2 billion or more for a new airframe to compete with 
the A-310 and, later in this decade, the A-320. I t  is an interesting 
strategy, forced on McDonnell Douglas by the imperatives of the market 
and the high and costly risks involved. If it fails, however, McDonnell 
Douglas will be locked out of the commercial airline business well into 
the 21st century. 
The Scramble Is Competitive 
What has happened, as a result, is that the engine manufacturers 
have, to a significant degree, become the pawns of their airframe 
manufacturers, who, in turn, are dependent on the poverty-stricken 
airlines. In their desperate search for volume, the sale of every single 
aircraft is important to the airframe and engine manufacturers. Com- 
petition for these sales has spilled out from the deregulated domestic 
market and become a world-wide phenomenon. No longer are sales 
within the United States sufficient to guarantee a production run that 
recoups outlays and insures profitability for the two American 
producers. Sales to Airbus' European bastion and, in particular, the 
newly emerging third world markets are vital to American manufac- 
turers' continued financial health and vitality. 
Dramatic tales of intrigue and espionage have surfaced about air- 
craft sales in the last few years. One of the first starting places was 
the concept of a new 150-seat aircraft, first broached by Airbus in the 
early 1980s. At the time, it was a logical concept. Of the world's fleet 
of 6,000 or so commercial aircraft, more than 10 percent were over 
16 years of age, while 30 percent were over 12 years old. With noise 
repression regulations coming into force in the United States in 1985, 
in Britain in 1986, and in Europe a t  large in 1988, most of these old 
planes - early model 707s, DC-8s, BAC I- l ls ,  VC-lOs, and Tridents 
- would be phased out since their low-bypass engines do not meet 
the new standards. These aircraft are single aisle planes that could 
naturally be replaced by a 150-seat aircraft. Except for the projected 
Airbus A-320, due in the late '80s, new aircraft have not been forth- 
coming. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas have both offered stopgap air- 
craft rather than risk new development and production commitments. 
In Boeing's case it is the 737-300, to be followed by the 737-400, and 
in McDonnell Douglas' case, the super 80 series. 
This is the aircraft battle for the rest of the century: the older, 
updated technology of Boeing and McDonnell versus the new tech- 
nology of Airbus. In the meantime, the little victories, the hand-won 
fights, go on. These are where the current aircraft sales battles lie. 
For example, Boeing and Airbus have battled on many fronts, one of 
the recent ones being Thailand where the victor would win two air- 
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craft orders. The bidding war waged to and fro with first Airbus, then 
Boeing, then finally, Airbus going ahead. At first Airbus seemed to 
hold the edge until General Electric said it could not deliver the engines 
it had promised. 
Pratt & Whitney stepped forward with its engines. Then the price 
cutting started. The larger H-310 was going for $63 million, the smaller 
767 for $53 million. Then the two airlines bid for Thai Airline's old 
fleet of DC-8s, offering competitive exchanges, in effect covering the 
prices of the planes to $56 million and $46 million, respectively. The 
situation became murky as  both groups increased their competition. 
At the end of it all, after close infighting, Airbus and General Elec- 
tric won the contract.14 Other ferocious infighting is in sight. The end 
result is an industrial shootout. 
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